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Abstract   The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has enabled Industry 4.0 as a new man-
ufacturing paradigm. The envisioned future of Industry 4.0 and Smart Factories 
LV WREHKLJKO\FRQILJXUDEOHDQGFRPSRVHGPDLQO\RI WKHµ7KLQJV¶ WKDWDUHH[
pected to come with some, often partial, assurance guarantees. However, many 
factories are categorised as safety-critical, e.g. due to the use of heavy machinery 
or hazardous substances. As such, some of the guarantees provided by the 
µ7KLQJV¶HJUHODWHGWRSHUIRUPDQFHand availability, are deemed as necessary 
in order to ensure the safety of the manufacturing processes and the resulting 
products. In this paper, we explore key safety challenges posed by Industry 4.0 
and identify the characteristics that its safety assurance should exhibit. We pro-
pose a modular safety assurance model by combination of the different actor re-
VSRQVLELOLWLHVHJV\VWHPLQWHJUDWRUVFORXGVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVDQG³7KLQJV´VXS
pliers. Besides the desirable modularity of such a safety assurance approach, our 
model provides a basis for cooperative, on-demand and continuous reasoning in 
order to address the reconfigurable nature of Industry 4.0 architectures and ser-
vices. We illustrate our approach based on a smart factory use case. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) can be seen as a system of inter-connected cyber-
physical objects that collect and exchange data. More formally, IoT is defined as 
³DJOREDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHIRUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\HQDEOLQJDGYDQFHGVHUYLFHV
by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving 
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LQWHURSHUDEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WHFKQRORJLHV´ >@ 7KLV LQIUD
structure allows the Things to be sensed and controlled remotely so that their 
integration into the physical world leads to different ways to utilise the Things in 
various reconfigurable applications. Cloud Computing is a fundamental infra-
structural element for IoT, enabling different types of X as a Service (XaaS)1 
[19], where X is a software, platform, infrastructure, etc. In this paper, we adopt 
the NIST definition of Cloud Computing: 
 
³a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool 
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction´>@ 
 
The marriage of the IoT and Cloud services (e.g., cloud XaaS) has paved the way 
towards the fourth industrial generation2, Industry 4.0, as a new trend of automa-
tion and data exchange in the manufacturing industry. This new industrial para-
digm is characterised by its ability to reconfigure and often optimise autono-
mously, particularly during the operational stages. Moving certain manufacturing 
services, e.g. scheduling and data storage and analytics, to the Cloud has potential 
benefits in cost reduction, energy efficiency, sharing of resources and increased 
flexibility. The use of Cloud Computing in critical applications has been high-
lighted as a significant area of research, especially for production and manufac-
turing systems [3], [7], [12], [26]. 
However, factories are often categorised as safety-critical systems as failures 
of these systems, under certain conditions, can lead to human harm or damage to 
property or the environment, e.g. due to the use of heavy machinery or hazardous 
substances. As such, the risk associated with the manufacturing processes and the 
resulting products has to be analysed, controlled and monitored. However, the 
reconfigurable, modular and dynamic nature of Smart Factories pose significant 
safety assurance challenges. For example, designers or operators of factories do 
not have much control over the design and evolution of the µ7KLQJV¶RU&ORXG-
based services that are increasingly being used in manufacturing processes. This 
potentially weakens confidence in the safety of the factory and can undermine 
the overall safety case [21], i.e. due to high degrees of uncertainty about the actual 
performance or behaviour oIWKHVHµ7KLQJV¶RU&ORXG-based services. 
Most of the reviewed published literature on IoT and Cloud Computing re-
veals focus on security in particular and dependability in general but without 
much focus on safety.  For example, the German automation technology supplier 
µ3,/=¶>@VWDWHGWKDWWKH,QGXVWU\YLVLRQHQWDLOVPRGXODUSODQWVEHLQJUHFRQ
figured quickly and flexibly. They view the control and decision-making process 
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in Industry 4.0 becoming more decentralised and highlight safety, in particular, 
as a fundamental challenge, with emphasis on the necessary modular certification 
of the individual factory devices (PILZ uses the term Safety 4.0 to indicate mod-
ular safety solutions). 
In this paper, we introduce a common Industry 4.0 architectural style (Section 
2) and explore its safety assurance characteristics (Section 3). We then propose a 
modular safety assurance model by diffusion of the different actor responsibili-
WLHVHJV\VWHPLQWHJUDWRUVFORXGVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVDQGµ7KLQJV¶VXSSOLHUV6HF
tion 4). Our model aims to provide a basis for cooperative, on-demand and con-
tinuous safety reasoning in order to address the reconfigurable and compositional 
nature of Industry 4.0 architectures. We illustrate our approach based on a smart 
factory use case (Section 5) and conclude in Section 6. 
2 Industry 4.0 Architecture 
In this section, we introduce a generic architecture for Industry 4.0. This archi-
tecture comprises three levels, as depicted in figure 1, where the Things and 
Fog/Edge levels typically represent the local part of the system, while the Cloud 
represents a remote infrastructure that is usually owned by a third-party service 
provider: 
භ The Things Level is composed of a set of Things that enable interaction 
with the physical environment via different sensing/actuating devices. 
We consider a Thing as an object capable of communicating with other 
networked devices [2]. Due to the limited storage and processing power, 
devices from this level rely on the Fog or Cloud infrastructures for stor-
age and processing services. 
භ The Fog Level is composed of a set of Fog/Edge devices that are directly 
connected to Things or/and Cloud infrastructure. We consider Fog de-
vices to be local computational devices that offer advanced storage and 
processing power to the Things and rely on remote Cloud infrastructure 
for high-power computing and storage. The Fog devices receive data 
from the Things and, depending on the system configuration, might for-
ward the data to the Cloud infrastructure. Moreover, the Fog devices 
may perform partial processing of the data and directly instruct com-
mands to the Things. 
භ The Cloud Level is composed of a set of remote servers providing on-
demand capabilities. The Cloud infrastructure typically receives data 
from the Fog devices, processes the data and forwards commands to the 
Things via Fog devices. 
 
The distribution of control, authority and responsibility between the Things and 
the Fog and Cloud infrastructures depends on factors such as (1) performance, 
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e.g.  avoiding the Cloud for hard real-time requirements, (2) global and adaptive 
services, e.g. Big Data analytics via the Cloud and (3) local situational awareness, 
e.g. via smart IoT-based devices. Understanding the behaviour and integrity of 
the individual Things and infrastructural elements, and their interactions, is a pre-
requisite for assuring the safety of Industry 4.0. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Industry 4.0 Generic Architecture 
3 Safety Characteristics for Industry 4.0  
Considering the capabilities of Industry 4.0, in this Section, we explore key char-
acteristics of its safety assurance. 
1) Modular and Cooperative: The safety assurance for Industry 4.0 will often 
have to be cooperative in a sense that a safety or assurance case cannot be 
built by a single stakeholder or organisation. Since the implementation of 
the business models is shifting from a single company to a network of ser-
vice providers [14], so does the resulting system shift from a standalone 
system to a network of devices and services, performing, cooperatively, a 
number of functionalities. Each business participating in the integrated sys-
tem, e.g. as a Thing VXSSOLHUEHLWD³GXPE´RUD³VPDUW´FRQQHFWHGGHYLFH
should accompany the provided Thing with a set of safety assurances for 
different usages. However, since the suppliers cannot provide all the needed 
safety assurances out-of-context, certain properties should be assured by the 
integrator in the context of the particular usage of the Thing. 
2) Continuous: Safety cases are used to justify how the risk of each identified 
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hazard has been eliminated or adequately mitigated. Industry 4.0 assumes 
that a modular factory can be reconfigured quickly and flexibly. The safety 
assurance of such a factory is expected to be in a position to accommodate 
this widening of flexibility. For safety cases, they should comprise evidence 
to make a convincing argument to support the relevant safety claims [15]. 
However, some claims and pieces of evidence might get invalidated due to 
reconfigurations that commonly take place in the factory, e.g. changes to the 
manufacturing processes and services. Hence, safety cases might be out of 
date and no longer reflect the actual safety performance of the system. To 
this end, the safety cases should be proactively reviewed and continuously 
maintained in order to justify the evolving status of the factory [6]. 
3) On-demand: As motivated in the previous characteristic, safety cases should 
be maintained after changing the associated factory to continuously demon-
strate the status of the safety performance. Sometimes, however, updating 
the safety cases is not feasible because of the nature of the changes. That is, 
there might be drastic changes to the factory that could introduce new and 
different types of hazards that require repeating the entire safety assurance 
process and generating more and/or new pieces of evidence. Here, re-con-
structing the safety cases might be necessary as a more cost-effective option 
compared to updating the existing cases [22]. 
 
In this paper, we limit our focus to the modular and cooperative characteristics 
of safety assurance for Industry 4.0, considering the overall safety case for Smart 
Factories and future needs for continuous and on-demand assurance. 
4 Industry 4.0 Safety Assurance Approach 
Assurance can be defined as justified confidence in a property of interest. In high-
risk domains, assurance is typically demonstrated through the provision of an 
assurance case, consisting of a structured argument, i.e. justification, supported 
by evidence [15]. In this paper, the assurance case is for safety properties (aka 
safety case). As discussed in Section 3, due to the co-operative nature of IoT, it 
is not possible for any single stakeholder to provide the assurance case for the 
entire system. 
The constituent Things, and the required infrastructure elements will be de-
veloped and provided by different organisations. It is these separate organisations 
that have the knowledge of the properties and characteristics of their components 
(i.e. Things or infrastructure elements). However, these suppliers are only able to 
reason about the assurance of their own components and can say little about the 
assurance of the IoT system as a whole, especially with regard to system- level 
conditions such as hazards, accidents and harm. The system integrator must 
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therefore consider what is required for safety assurance and then show that the 
Things or infrastructure elements being used are able to support this. 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed IoT Assurance Case Architecture 
This leads us to propose a modular approach to assurance for IoT-based sys-
tems as indicated in figure 2.  The figure shows the overall assurance case struc-
ture for the IoT-based system, split into a number of modules, where each module 
reasons about   a different aspect of the system. There are assurance modules for 
each of the Things and infrastructure elements, and modules dealing with the 
assurance of the integration of these into an IoT system. The different stakehold-
ers have assurance responsibilities within the structure in figure 2 in order to en-
sure that a compelling overall assurance case for the IoT system can be created. 
These responsibilities are discussed below.  
4.1 Responsibilities of Things or Infrastructure Providers  
Each of these providers must define an assurance contract.  This contract defines 
the set of properties that they are able to assure and a definition of potential failure 
behaviour of their Things or infrastructures. In order to be usable as part of the 
integrated assurance case for the IoT system, each of the identified properties 
should be defined with the following assume-guarantee reasoning form: 
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if {condition} then {Thing or infrastructure} shall provide {property} with 
confidence of {confidence} 
 
The condition and property represent the assumptions and guarantees of an as-
sume-guarantee contract [23]. The condition and confidence of this assume-guar-
antee contract specification is crucial to our approach. For any Thing or infra-
structure, there exist limitations on the circumstances under which it can perform 
its function. For example, an assurance contract for a pressure sensor may in-
clude: 
If temperature is greater than -20C then pressure sensor shall provide air 
pressure value with accuracy of 0.001% with confidence of 99%. 
 
It should be noted that, unless some failure has occurred, the pressure sensor is 
expected to provide an air pressure value. However, at temperatures below -20&
the confidence in that value will be reduced. If this confidence is not defined at 
these lower temperatures, then the property cannot be assured outside that tem-
perature range. This may then require alternative pressure sensing capabilities (or 
some other guarantee of temperature range) in order to create the assurance case. 
Knowing the level of confidence with which a Thing or infrastructure can 
guarantee a particular property is also crucial to the integration process as it ena-
bles the overall level of assurance for the system properties to be determined. 
Further, each Thing or infrastructure provider must be able to reason about the 
completeness and correctness of the failure behaviour definition provided as part 
of the contract. These definitions of such failure behaviour are also taken into 
account when assessing the assurance of the integrated system. It should be noted 
that the information required of the Thing or infrastructure provider described 
above is specific to the Thing or infrastructure, but in no way specific to the par-
ticular IoT system of which that Thing or infrastructure may become a part. This 
facilitates the use of independently, commercially developed and reusable com-
ponents as part of the safety assurance framework. 
,QWHJUDWRU¶V5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV 
The integrator has responsibility for creating the IoT system by utilising the In-
ternet-enabled Things and infrastructure elements. The integrator therefore also 
has responsibility for demonstrating the overall safety assurance of the IoT sys-
tem. As previously discussed, the integrator should have available to them infor-
mation about the assurance of the individual Things or infrastructures through 
the assume-guarantee contract specifications. The integrator must show how the 
assurance provided for the Things or infrastructures can be used to demonstrate 
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the assurance of system- level properties. In particular, the integrator must iden-
tify the hazards, i.e. sources of potential harm, and their associated risks, posed 
by the system, e.g. unsecured loads, laser radiation or heavy machines operating 
in the presence of operators. For any configuration of Things or infrastructures, 
the integrator must then determine the safety requirements for each of these by 
identifying how the Things or infrastructures may contribute to hazards (this 
could for example be done through considering deviations on the functionality or 
interactions). 
Once these requirements are known, the safety assurance case for the IoT sys-
tem can be created if it can be demonstrated that 1) the properties in the contracts 
are able to satisfy the assurance requirements defined for the IoT-based system 
with sufficient confidence, and 2) the contracts of the relevant Things or infra-
structure elements are satisfied (the properties and conditions are met and the 
failure modes are mitigated). As discussed, the Thing or infrastructure element 
provider has responsibility for specifying the contract for that element and ensur-
ing the properties are met, however it is the responsibility of the integrator to 
ensure the conditions are satisfied, and the identified failure modes of the element 
are mitigated in the context of the overall IoT system (through a variety of mech-
anisms such as redundancy, monitoring, operational constraints etc.).  
In order to facilitate this integration of an overall safety case, we propose the 
use of assurance case contracts. Assurance case contracts provide a mechanism 
for recording and justifying the agreed relationship between assurance case mod-
ules. Figure 2 shows assurance case contracts being established between the IoT-
based system assurance case module and the individual component modules. The 
structure that such a contract module might have is illustrated as a pattern in fig-
ure 3, using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). Readers who are unfamiliar 
with this notation are referred to the GSN Standard [1] for more detailed infor-
mation. 
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Fig. 3. Structure of an Assurance Case Contract for IoT System 
Figure 3 shows how in order to assure a safety requirement identified by the in-
tegrator, a number of the Things or infrastructure elements may need to be con-
sidered. For each of these, the contract defined for those elements is used to make 
the assurance argument. In Figure 3 we show only how this is done for Things, 
but a similar argument structure would be used for infrastructure elements as 
well. In order to form the assurance case contract, it must be demonstrated that 
the properties defined in the contract for each element are sufficient to satisfy the 
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safety requirement. It must then be demonstrated that each aspect of the contract 
for each element is satisfied. Claims about the satisfaction of the properties, and 
the identification of failure behaviour, are supported by a safety case module de-
veloped by the provider of that element and provided to the integrator along with 
the element itself. 
Needless to say, establishing and justifying assurance case contracts is a chal-
lenging task. The specification of the assurance model and clear definition of the 
VXSSOLHU¶VDVVXUDQFHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUHPHUHO\DILUVWVWHSWRZDUGVWKLV$FRQ
tract- based assurance approach is potentially desirable for an IoT- based system 
as the contract helps to determine whether the relationship between the assurance 
case modules continues to hold and the (combined) safety assurance case remains 
valid when Things or infrastructures are altered or substituted in the system. This 
issue is discussed further in Section 6. 
5 Use Case 
In this section we present a fictitious, yet representative, Smart Factory and focus 
on a single part of the factory to illustrate safety assurance for Industry 4.0. We 
focus on a Warning Light System (WLS) as a safety measure that includes IoT-
related elements. We demonstrate our approach by performing safety analysis of 
the WLS and developing a corresponding argument for the system based on the 
assurance case contract structure presented in Section 4. 
5.1 Smart Factory Description 
Our use case considers scenarios where the requirements and design specification 
for the manufacturing of a product are provided via a Cloud-based service. Some 
of the manufacturing control capabilities reside remotely on the Cloud, e.g. 
scheduling and design reconfiguration. Others are managed locally either at the 
Fog or Things levels. More specifically, our use case considers a manufacturing 
factory in which a number of computer-based machine tools make a range of 
gearbox shafts from metal blanks. The blanks, which weigh about 4kg each, are 
delivered in pallets of 50, and stored in an automated warehouse until they are 
required. Finished products are also packed into pallets and taken to a holding 
area before being shipped to the main assembly plant. 
The movement of pallets around the plant is managed using an Automatic 
Guided Vehicle (AGV) system. The system consists of a number of battery-pow-
ered vehicles, each fitted with pallet handling equipment, whose movements are 
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directed by an AGV Central Control Fog. This is interfaced to a Warehouse Con-
trol, Holding Area Control and Machining Control Fogs, so that stock movement 
requirements can be fulfilled. Each AGV will carry only one pallet at a time. The 
conceptual flow of materials is illustrated in figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Flow of Materials and Information through the Factory 
To manage different automated activities in the factory, Light Imaging, Detec-
tion, and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors are positioned to cover the whole factory. 
Such a sHWXSDOORZVWKH6PDUW)DFWRU\WR³VHH´ZKDWLVJRLQJRQLHLQUHDOWLPH
and to manage the activities accordingly. A Cloud service is used for the integra-
tion of the LIDAR inputs and for modelling the activities in the factory. This 
Cloud service allows for customisable features to be implemented specific to dif-
ferent factory operations. Special docking stations are provided for the AGVs, 
each weighing about 0.8 tonnes. The vehicles will normally be directed by the 
central Fog to return to these charging stations when they are not required to 
move pallets. The factory is not fully automated, and people cannot be excluded 
from the areas where the AGVs operate. 
5.2 Hazard Analysis 
Since the factory employs both human workers and machines of different auton-
omy levels, there are many factory-level hazards, e.g. proximity to heavy moving 
objects. One general safety measure is to define restricted areas for the different 
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factory configurations to protect the human workers from both the moving ma-
chinery and the dangerous goods they transport. In this use case, we focus on a 
single factory-level hazard: ³8QDXWKRULVHG $*9 YHKLFOH HQWHUV WKH UHVWULFWHG
DUHD´. Due to the noise protection procedures that human workers may be using 
in certain configurations, audio warning is not sufficient, so a visual warning light 
system is also needed. Amongst the different safety requirements specified to ad- 
dress this hazard, we focus on the following requirement: ³$ZDUQLQJOLJKWVKDOO
be signalled when an unauthorised AGV entHUVWKHUHVWULFWHGDUHD´. This require-
ment is allocated a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2, based on the likelihood and 
severity of the considered factory-level hazard.   
To achieve this requirement, several other sub-requirements should be speci-
fied. We mention only some: 
R1: The system shall distinguish between authorised and unauthorised AGVs. 
R2: The scope of the restricted area shall be specified to 5cm degree of pre-
cision. 
R3: The signalling of the warning light shall occur within 0.5sec from an un-
authorised AGV entering the restricted area. 
 
The main objective of the proposed Warning Light System (WLS) is to monitor 
restricted areas where certain types of objects (humans, robots, vehicles, etc.) are 
prohibited due to safety reasons. The system is intended to trigger a warning light 
if an object classified as prohibited under the given factory configuration appears 
in the designated restricted area. 
The high-level architecture of the WLS is presented in figure 5. WLS is im-
plemented using the Cloud service and the factory LIDARs. We focus on a par-
ticular configuration and   a specific restricted area for that configuration, as pre-
sented in figure 5. The considered restricted area includes 3 LIDARs, 4 access 
points and 4 warning light lamps. The gateway and local control device are lo-
cated within the factory, but outside of the restricted area. The access points fa-
cilitate wireless communication between the sensors/lamps and the gateway, 
while the gateway enables connection to the cloud service that acts as a control 
node.  
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Fig. 5. Smart Factory Use Case: WLS Configuration 
The considered WLS is composed of: 
Things: 
1) LIDARs 1-3 (identical) 
2) Warning Light 1-4 (identical) 
Infrastructure elements: 
3) Gateway/Router (local control node) 
4) Access Point 1-4 (identical) 
5) Cloud Service (control node) 
 
The Cloud service is responsible for processing the data and commanding the 
activation of the warning light via the local network. The Cloud is also responsi-
ble for monitoring all moving objects in the factory. The local controller is only 
responsible for the most severe restricted area violations. As such, it only moni-
tors certain objects entering the area. The initial requirements are further decom-
posed and allocated to the IoT system elements to more clearly specify their func-
tion. For example, for the R1 requirement we specify sub-requirements such as: 
 
R1.1: LIDARs shall detect all objects entering the restricted area. 
R1.2: The cloud service shall analyse and classify all detected objects. 
R1.3: The gateway shall analyse and classify only the most dangerous objects. 
R1.4: The gateway shall transmit all the sensor data to the cloud service. 
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Similarly, for the requirement R3, we decompose it to allocate the timing require-
ments on the operations of the different elements. For example, a sub-require-
PHQW5FDQEHVSHFLILHGDV³7KHZDUQLQJOLJKWVVKDOOHQJDJHRQUHFHLSWRIWKH
HQJDJHFRPPDQGZLWKLQVHF´ 
5.3 WLS Failure Analysis 
So far, we have defined safety requirements for WLS without considering failures 
of the individual elements. In this section we consider hazardous contributions of 
all the WLS IoT system elements and their contributions to the considered haz-
ard. Some of the identified hazardous failures for the IoT system elements are as 
follows: 
භ LIDARs 
o No signal provided 
o Unable to detect unauthorised object entering restricted area 
o Signal reports incorrect light conditions 
භ Warning light lamps 
o The warning light does not turn on when requested 
o The warning light turns on with a delay greater than 0.2sec 
භ Access Points 
o Access point fails to route data to the Gateway  
o Access point takes longer than intended to route data 
භ Cloud Service 
o Cloud does not generate warning signal request  
o Cloud generates an incorrect warning signal request 
o Cloud takes longer than intended to generate warning signal re-
quest. 
 
We have also derived safety requirements to address the above hazardous fail-
ures. For example, these requirements include the following:  
1) ³(DFKUHVWULFWHGDUHDVKDOOKDYHDWOHDVWWZRZDUQLQJODPSVYLVLEOHIURPHYHU\
SRVLWLRQLQWKHDUHD´ 
2) ³(DFKPRYLQJREMHFW LQ WKHIDFWRU\VKDOOKDYHDPDUNLQJGHWHFWDEOHE\/,
'$56´DQG 
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3) ³+XPDQZRUNHUVVKDOOEHQRWLILHGRIWKH:/6IDLOXUHV´  
All the derived requirements are assigned with at least SIL 2, based on the cor-
responding higher-level requirement. 
5.4 Assurance Case Contract Example for WLS 
The application of the assurance case contract, as defined in Section 4, is pre-
sented in figure 6.  
In the presented argument we focus on the safety requirement R3 of WLS and 
detail in particular the warning light lamp element. The supplier of the lamp is 
able to provide an assurance case for the lamp that supports various claims about 
the lamp as detailed in the assume-guarantee contract. In the example in figure 6 
we see that the lamp assumes a constant power supply and working temperature 
in a predefined range in order to provide assurance of maximum light intensity 
within 0.2 seconds during the promised lifespan.  
The confidence in this claim is provided by the lamp assurance case. In form-
ing the assurance case contract shown in figure 6, this claim about the lamp is 
used to support a safety requirement as part of the higher-level factory assurance 
case (in other words, the assurance case contract reasons that this lamp is suffi-
cient, from a safety perspective, for its use as part the factory operations).  
Figure 6 shows how the assurance case contract also must consider the known 
failure behaviours of the lamp as detailed by the supplier. The effects of the fail-
ure behaviours are shown to be mitigated by the AGV and the Smart Factory 
configuration. 
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Fig. 6. The Warning Light Lamp Assurance Case Contract 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
We have highlighted a number of safety challenges posed by Industry 4.0 and 
proposed a modular assurance approach that has the potential to address some of 
these challenges, particularly with regard to the compositional and configurable 
nature of IoT-based architectures. In essence, our approach builds on past and 
current research on assume-guarantee reasoning, contract-based assurance and 
modular certification for safety-critical applications [20] [16] [8]. Historically, 
these approaches formed the basis for safety cases and certification for systems 
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in various domains including automotive [24] and aviation [5]. However, some 
fundamental safety assurance problems remain and have to be addressed as a 
prerequisite for realising the general-purpose vision of Industry 4.0. We explore, 
and reflect on, these in the rest of this section. 
 
A. Industry 4.0 Safety Validation Challenge 
We discussed the potential for modular and contract-based reasoning to drive the 
structure of the overall safety case for Industry 4.0 architectures and meet the 
safety requirements. However, the fundamental problem does not lie in how the 
configurable architectures meet the safety requirements. Rather, the issue lies in 
the generation of these safety requirements in the first place. The ad hoc assem-
blage of Things and infrastructures for Industry 4.0 architectures will likely result 
in new hazards and/or risk ratings and as such new safety requirements. These 
emerging hazards are due to expected, yet unpredictable, reconfigurations or re-
deployments of the architecture in multiple contexts (i.e. we cannot assume that 
the world is stable, and variation only lies within our system). This will often 
mean that the hazard analysis, or at least a large part of it, will have to be manually 
repeated for each reconfiguration or deployment and should produce an updated 
set of safety requirements (i.e. each of these changes might be considered as a 
new factory).  This can be seen as undermining the general-purpose and reusable 
nature of Industry 4.0 architectures, i.e. where rapid reconfiguration and deploy-
ment is seen as a unique selling point. In other words, modularity and contract-
based reasoning largely deal with the verification issue whereas hazard analysis 
of the whole system addresses the validation problem. Safety validation, against 
the intended real-world usage, is the essence of safety assurance and how risk 
and harm are assessed, perceived and accepted. 
 
B. Industry 4.0 Safety Confidence Challenge 
In our example definition of assurance contracts for Things and infrastructures 
within Industry 4.0 architectures, we highlighted the need to specify necessary 
properties that have to be provided (e.g. measurement of air pressure values) to a 
particular level of integrity (e.g. accuracy of 0.001%) and confidence (e.g. 99%). 
For large socio-technical IoT systems such as Smart Factories, confidence will 
inevitably be measured using different qualitative [11] and quantitative [6] indi-
cators. Propagating confidence from the different qualitative and quantitative 
measures associated with the various Things in an infrastructure is necessary to 
assess confidence in the safety of the overall configured system [10]. This has to 
be performed dynamically and on-demand to address the particular reconfigura-
ble characteristics of Industry 4.0 architectures. This is a grand safety challenge 
for Industry 4.0 (and safety engineering generally). Current approaches to speci-
fying confidence and associating it with assume-guarantee contract specification 
for individual components is relatively straightforward compared to the challenge 
of assessing, dynamically, confidence for the different reconfigurations. 
122      Jaradat et al 
 
 
C. Industry 4.0 Commercial Pressure Challenge 
The financial appeal of commercially available Things and infrastructures, which 
appear to be dependable although they are not developed for safety-critical ap-
plications, should not be undermined. The business pressure is mounting on 
safety engineers to accept the use of, relatively cheap, consumer electronics and 
commercially available cloud-based services. Resistance from the safety commu-
nity on the basis of difficulty or novelty could be counter-productive. This might 
result in alienating or excluding safety engineers when design decisions are made 
or more likely, and sometimes rightly so, appealing to reduction in overall risk 
despite increases in technological risks (e.g. a typical risk-benefit argument in 
clinical applications in which clinical benefits outweigh technological risks [13]). 
 
D. Industry 4.0 Security-Informed Safety Challenge 
There is now almost a consensus on the necessity to address cyber security in 
safety assurance [4]. This issue takes a greater significance for Industry 4.0 where 
remote connectivity and the use of commercially available infrastructures and 
Things expose the system to a wide range of cyber threats (particularly Distrib-
uted Denial of Service [9]). Security risks tend to be more dynamic than safety 
risks. As such, exploring the extent to which an Industry 4.0 architecture might 
have to reconfigure in the event of a security breach is a significant challenge, 
particularly in how it might compromise safety assurance (i.e. a typical trade-off 
between safety and security that has to be made more explicit in the safety assur-
ance case). 
In conclusion, in this paper, we explored a number of characteristics for the 
safety assurance of Industry 4.0 and focused on modularity as a key aspect of the 
overall assurance case for safety. We also highlighted some grand challenges that 
remain and will be a focus for our future work. 
Terminology 
XaaS ± Anything (X) as a Service 
Internet of Things (IoT) - a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling ad-
vanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing 
and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies. 
Thing devices ± enable interaction with the physical environment via different sensors/actua-
tors. 
Cloud Computing ± a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access 
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, stor-
age, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. 
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Edge Computing ± a decentralized infrastructure in which parts of applications, management 
and data analytics are moved to the end devices such that computing is performed 
as close as possible to the data source. 
Fog Computing - a decentralised infrastructure in which parts of applications, management 
and data analytics are moved into the network itself using a distributed computing 
model. 
Fog/Edge Devices ± local computational devices that offer advanced storage and processing 
power to the Things and rely on remote Cloud infrastructure for high-power com-
puting and storage. 
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